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Abstract 
The  current  framework  for  improving  aid  effectiveness,  the  ‘Paris’  agenda  of 
harmonisation and alignment, has been found lacking. Alternatives are needed. 
This paper highlights some examples of recent innovations in the management 
and  delivery  of  development  aid.  Drawing  upon  Barder  (2009)  and  Howes 
(2011), the paper structures 11 innovations into three categories: improving the 
quality  of  the  aid  donor;  improving  the  quality  of  the  aid  recipient;  and 
improving how donors interact and the way aid is given. By examining these 11 
innovations, the paper shows that aid agencies have the potential to adapt and 
evolve.  The  challenge  for  donors  is  to  start  selecting  good  ideas  for 
implementation  now  and  to  never  stop  searching  for  new  innovations  to 
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Beyond Paris: 11 innovations in aid effectiveness  
1.   Introduction 
This paper provides some examples of new innovations in the management and delivery 
of development aid. It is not a comprehensive survey of recent aid reforms. The aim is to 
promote  discussion,  encourage  feedback  on  lessons  of  recent  innovations  and  help 
identify future reforms.  
The starting position for this analysis is that aid will continue to represent a large, and 
probably growing, commitment of rich governments. Australia, for example, plans to 
double its aid program from $4.3 billion in 2010–11 to about $8.6 billion in 2015–16 
(0.5% of GNI), and other donors have scaled up or are planning to. Yet this scaling up is 
taking place at a time when public finances in many rich countries, including Australia, 
are  under  pressure  and  there  is  growing  scrutiny  of  development  aid  budgets.  It  is 
therefore appropriate to ask what can be done to make aid expenditure more effective 
and to assess practical innovations for achieving this.  
The next section of this paper provides a conceptual framework for thinking about the 
determinants of aid effectiveness, drawing on the work of Barder (2009) and a recent 
Development Policy Centre discussion paper (Howes 2011). It also briefly explores the 
traditional so-called ‘Paris’ reform agenda based around harmonisation and alignment, 
and the limits of this agenda.  
This leads into the next three sections of the paper: a discussion of 11 recent innovations 
in development aid. This discussion is set in three parts, drawing on the three categories 
introduced by Howes (2011) and discussed in the second section.  
  Section  3 considers innovations to improve the quality of aid recipients: new 
forms of ex-ante selectivity and results-based aid.  
  Section 4 discusses four innovations to the way in which donors and recipients 
interact:  cash  transfers,  working  with  new  partners,  virtual  networks  for 
collaboration, and market-based reforms for technical assistance.  2 
 
  Section  5  discusses  five  innovations  to  improve  the  quality  of  aid  donors: 
selectivity,  aid  transparency,  independent  evaluation,  crowdsourcing  aid 
information and feedback, and reducing volatility.  
The breadth and size of these innovations, which are taking place in most major donor 
agencies, is indicative of the growing pressure to improve the overall effectiveness of aid 
expenditure. The innovations also reflect  the capability of aid agencies to adapt  and 
change. There is clearly a wide variety of approaches and ideas as to how to improve aid 
effectiveness. As we conclude in Section 6, the key for donors is to start selecting good 
ideas  for  implementation  now,  and  to  never  stop  searching  for  new  innovations  to 
improve aid effectiveness. 
2. Aid effectiveness: Good ideas, slow implementation 
2.1. Determinants of aid effectiveness 
A lot is known about how to improve the effectiveness of aid. Howes (2011) provides a 
useful  conceptual  framework  for  considering  the  determinants  of  aid  effectiveness 
which draws on a wide literature, grouping the factors that determine aid effectiveness 
into  three  different  categories.  These  categories  consider  reforms  to  improve  the 
performance of recipients and donors, as well as the interactions between the two. The 
table  below  provides  a  summary  of  these  determinants,  their  roots  in  the  research 









Table 1. Aid determinants and policy responses 
Determinants of aid effectiveness   Policy response  
1. The quality of the government of the recipient country  
The World Bank Assessing Aid report (1998) claimed to show 
that aid was more effective in countries that had sounder 
policies. The econometrics behind this claim has since been 
debunked (Easterly, Levine, Roodman, 2003), but the finding 
itself appears sound (Dollar and Burnside, 2004).  
 
It is widely accepted that domestic institutions are the 
primary determinant of domestic economic performance 
(Rodrik, 2003). If this is the case, then one would indeed 
expect the productivity of aid in a particular country to be a 
function of the institutions of that country. 
 
Use more ex-ante selectivity  
 
Use more results-based aid  
 
 
Demonstration projects  
 





2. The quality of the aid donor  
Some analysts argue that the performance of aid is 
undermined because aid donors are not subject to the usual 
accountability and feedback mechanisms that govern public 
sector operations in developed countries (Easterly, 2006; 
Svensson, 2008). 
 
The large levels of discretion around aid activities can 
undermine performance, and aid donors may also lack the 
local and technical knowledge required to be effective 
operators. 
Make donors more 
accountable  
 
More independent evaluation  
 
 
Reduce the knowledge 
burden  
 
Operational independence  
 
Reduce aid volatility 
3. The way in which donors and recipients interact  
Donors themselves now recognise that the presence of a large 
number of aid agencies acting in an uncoordinated manner 
and independently of government increases the transaction 
costs for recipient governments. Such donor behaviour can 
also undermine the legitimacy and performance of the 
governments donors are trying to assist.  
Harmonise and align donor 
activity  
 
Work more with NGOs and 
private sector  
Source: Adapted from Howes (2011). 
Howes stresses the need for a multi-pronged approach:  
“Each of these diagnoses [that the problem with aid is the recipient, the donor, or 
the relationship between a recipient and its multiple donors] captures some of 
the truth about aid effectiveness, though analysts differ on their importance. In 
the view of most economists and aid practitioners, the first is the most important. 
An  effective recipient government is able to direct  the aid process, and so to 
compensate  for  weaknesses  of  donor  agencies,  and  to  ensure  that  donor-
government  interactions  are  reasonably  well-organised.  This  implies  that  aid 4 
 
agencies  should  direct  more  aid  to  more  effective  governments,  and  try  to 
improve the standards of governance in their aid recipients. However, both these 
strategies  can  only  be  pushed  so  far.  Often  the  risks  associated  with  aid 
withdrawal  are  particularly  high  in  relation  to  the  worst-performing 
governments. And the capacity of aid programs to improve governance standards 
is often severely limited. Given this limited scope for navigation in this domain, 
aid donors which want to improve aid effectiveness will also need to focus on the 
second  and  third  determinants:  improving  their  own  performance,  and 
strengthening donor coordination.” (Howes 2011, p. 7) 
2.2. The official donor reform agenda 
The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action are the primary references used in 
defining the international consensus on reforms to improve aid effectiveness.  
The 2005 Paris Declaration agenda for reform is organised around five key principles:  
  Ownership:  Recipient  countries  exercise  leadership  and  ownership  of  their 
development policies and direction  
  Alignment:  Donors  base  their  overall  support  on  the  national  development 
strategies, institutions and procedures of partner countries  
  Harmonisation:  Donor  actions  become  more  coordinated,  integrated  and 
transparent  
  Managing for results: Resources and decision making are now oriented around 
results  
  Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are both mutually accountable for 
development results  
The  most  striking  component  of  the  2005  Paris  Declaration  was  the  addition  of 
indicators to measure international progress of signatories towards goals set for 2010. 
The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action reaffirmed the objectives set by the Paris Declaration, 
and also stressed the importance of aid transparency and civil society engagement in 
donor institutions.  
At the core of this agenda are harmonisation and alignment. 5 
 
2.2.1. Harmonisation 
Simply  put,  harmonisation  is  an  attempt  to  facilitate  greater  coordination  and 
integration of activities between donors. Harmonisation attempts to significantly reduce 
transaction  costs  by  calling  on  donors  to  implement  common  planning,  funding, 
disbursement,  monitoring  and  evaluation,  and  reporting  procedures;  promote  joint 
missions, analytic work, and training with other donors; and fully delegate the execution 
of aid activities and programs with other donors.  
The Paris Declaration set out two monitorable indicators and set standards for progress 
by  2010  with  regards  to  harmonisation.  The  first  indicator  is  the  percentage  of  aid 
provided as program-based support. The second indicator is the percentage of joint field 
missions  and  country  analytic  work,  including  diagnostic reviews.  A  follow-up  2008 
survey by the OECD shows limited progress. 
Figure 1: 2007 Progress to Harmonisation targets (33 Country Survey) 
 
Source: OECD DAC 2008 
Clearly, although there has been some effort towards harmonising donor activities, the 
pace of change will be insufficient to meet the 2010 targets.  
2.2.2. Alignment  
Alignment is essentially the process of donors lining up behind recipient governments 
by channeling aid through government national procurement and distribution systems. 
Alignment requires that donors commit to using national systems while at the same time 
recipients commit to strengthening those systems. The theory is that this will allow for 
both  a  reduction  in  transaction  costs  and  an  increase  in  ownership  of  aid  flows  by 
recipient governments. In the long term it is expected that alignment, by channeling 
more funds through national systems, will strengthen the institutional capacity of those 
systems.  Alignment  is  arguably  required  because  by  working  around  government 6 
 
systems,  foreign  aid  reduces  the  internal  pressure  for  reform  and  good  governance 
practices within recipient countries (Rogerson 2005).  
By putting more funds through already weak government systems in poor countries, it 
can also be argued that alignment runs the risk of facilitating further corruption and 
delaying development results (Svensson 2008). The Paris Declaration attempts to curb 
this  risk  by  requiring  alignment  only  when  recipient  financial  systems  are  rated 
satisfactory (OECD 2005), ruling out the majority of Least Developed Economies in the 
world. However, working with government systems may also enable donors to put more 
pressure on governments (Howes 2011).  
The Paris Declaration sets out eight monitorable indicators for improvement in various 
dimensions of alignment to be achieved between 2005 and 2010. While many of the 
indicators have obvious impacts on alignment, such as donors’ use of country public 
finance management and procurement systems, others are unclear. The OECD (2008) 
states  that  untied  aid  improves  recipient  country  ownership  of  aid  and  thus  the 
program’s alignment, while making aid more predictable enforces alignment by making 
aid more reliable as a key component of a country’s budget. These indicators, and the 
progress made in each as at 2007, can be seen in figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: 2007 Progress towards Alignment indicators (33 Country Survey) 
 
Source: OECD DAC 2008 7 
 
Unlike harmonisation, there is good progress in a couple of areas. However, the overall 
progress indicated by 2007 suggests that the majority of the desired objectives will not 
be reached by 2010. 
2.2.3. Progress as at 2010  
The  2010  Paris  Declaration  evaluation  (OECD  DAC  2011)  shows  similar  results,  as 
Figure  3  shows.  All  but  one  of  the  11  indicators  used  to  measure  progress  on 
harmonisation  and  alignment  have  not  been  met  by  the  2010  deadline.  Overall,  the 
evaluation finds that “much further effort on more active harmonization is required” 
(p.19) and that there is “limited if any overall increase by most donors in the use of 
country systems and processes” (p.24). 
Figure 3: Paris Declaration Indicators and targets 2010 
 
Source: OECD DAC 2011 8 
 
2.3. Why is implementation slow?  
If donors agree on key reforms then why are they not being implemented? For example, 
it should be possible to reduce the number of aid projects; make aid more predictable; 
untie aid; and harmonise projects, yet progress is slow.  
There have been many critiques to explain why the Paris Declaration reforms are failing 
to meet their targets. One argument is that donors are unwilling to promote further 
recipient ownership because they will lose authority over the distribution of taxpayer 
funds (Martens, 2005). Another is the paradox that, if harmonisation  and alignment 
worked perfectly, aid agencies would be working towards their own demise (Rogerson, 
2005), or at least helping to shrink the industry. It can also be argued that there are no 
real penalties for non-compliance and there are strong domestic pressures driving aid 
outside of the objective of poverty reduction (Rogerson, 2005). It is also possible that 
the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of the Paris Declaration works for some aid recipients but 
not others: namely, fragile states.  
Barder (2009) argues that despite donor declarations, we are locked in a deep political 
equilibrium that leads to sub-optimal aid. Beyond the determinants of aid effectiveness, 
we also need to consider the determinants of the ‘political equilibrium’ for aid policy:  
“The aid system is in a political equilibrium, determined by deep characteristics 
of the aid relationship and the political economy of aid institutions. Reformers 
should seek to change that equilibrium rather than try to move away from it. The 
priority should be on reforms that put pressure on the aid system to evolve in the 
right direction rather than on grand designs.” (Barder, 2009, p. 1)  
Barder’s  paper  sets  out  a  framework  for  thinking  about  the  relationship  between 
effectiveness and the political economy of aid. It discusses how the implementation of 
aid is complicated by donors’ multiple objectives, imperfect  information  and broken 
feedback  loops,  principal  agent  problems  within  aid  agencies,  and  collective  action 
problems among aid agencies. Each of these contributes to a range of aid problems: an 
undermining  of  accountability;  poverty  reduction  being  compromised  by  pursuit  of 
other  interests;  proliferation  and  high  transaction  costs;  short-termism  and  lack  of 
predictability; and a lack of focus on results (Barder 2009).  9 
 
Barder’s  paper  shows  the  importance  of  focusing  not  only  the  determinants  of  aid 
effectiveness but on reforms which shift the political economy of aid. Neglect of this is no 
doubt one reason for the relative failure of the Paris reforms.  
Clearly giving aid isn’t easy. Despite consensus on many of the reforms that should lead 
to better aid, as identified in the aid literature and reflected in the Paris Declaration, 
progress in implementing them has been slow. Yet, at the same time, as we show in this 
paper, aid delivery has continued to adapt and evolve.  
2.4. Summing up  
While the Paris reforms are probably a step in the right direction for improving aid 
effectiveness, they are no magic bullet. To substantially improve aid effectiveness, work 
is needed on all of the three fronts that are highlighted in the framework outlined by 
Howes  (2011).  This  paper  does  not  incorporate  all  recent  innovations  in  aid 
effectiveness, and in particular omits those associated with the Paris Declaration, such 
as Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs). It instead introduces 11 ‘post-Paris’ innovations 
that the authors believe will best take the aid effectiveness agenda forward, by tackling 
both the determinants of aid effectiveness as set out in Howes (2011) and the political 
economy of aid as discussed in Barder (2009). 
3. Innovations to improve the quality of aid recipients 
This section provides some examples of aid innovations that aim to improve the quality 
of aid recipients. We suggest that disappointing results in using aid to improve the aid 
recipient institutions − through technical assistance and conditionality (Howes 2011) − 
have shifted attention towards two interesting innovations that create competition for 
aid: ex-ante selectivity and more results-based aid.  
3.1. A new approach to ex-ante selectivity  
Linking  aid  more  closely  to  performance  is  an  attractive  idea  for  both  donors  and 
recipients, and one that has been around for a long time. From a donor perspective it 
helps to allocate aid resources more efficiently by scaling up programs with good results 
and scaling back in areas where aid is less effective. From the recipient government’s 
perspective it is a way to access more aid resources free from conditionality and foreign 10 
 
interference  in  domestic  affairs.  It  may  also  help  to  improve  the  accountability  of 
developing  country  governments  to  their  own  citizens  by  providing  incentives  to 
improve  the  quality  of  service  delivery.  Taxpayers  will  see  the  benefit  in  their  aid 
contributions being effectively spent.  
The World Bank’s ‘Performance Based Allocation System’ (PBAS) is probably the best 
known example of factoring performance into aid allocations (World Bank 2010d). The 
PBAS has formed the basis of allocating resources within IDA, the World Bank’s Primary 
fund for poverty reduction, since the late 1970s and it was used to distribute 84% of 
IDA’s resources in its last replenishment round (World Bank 2010a). The main factor 
determining  a  country’s  place  in  this  system  is  the  Country  Policy  and  Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA), which is a measure of performance in implementing policies that are 
thought  to  promote  economic  growth  and  poverty  reduction  (World  Bank  2010d). 
During the last round of IDA funding, the recipient countries in the top performance 
quintile received about 2.7 times the allocations per capita of those in the lowest quintile 
(World  Bank  2010d).  This  approach  has,  however,  been  deemed  too  inflexible  for 
bilateral  partners,  which  has  in  the  past  limited  the  use  of  ex-ante  selectivity  to 
improving overall aid effectiveness.  
An approach to ex-ante selectivity’ that may be much more suitable for bilateral donors 
than the PBAS is DFID’s internal resource bidding on the basis of expected development 
outcomes. In November 2010, DFID announced a bottom-up bilateral aid review of its 
work through country and regional programs1. As part of this review, all DFID country 
and regional teams were asked to develop ‘results offers’, setting out the outcomes they 
expected to deliver over the next five years in a number of priority areas. This means 
that DFID can now weigh actual results against expected results on an incremental and 
structured  basis,  an  innovation  which  allows  for  redistribution  of  aid  to  where 
performance and expected results are highest. This will increase the overall effective 
allocation of aid resources and these ‘results offers’, rated against  estimated country 
need,  now  form  the  basis  of  continued  distribution  of  bilateral  aid  resources  (DFID 
2011).  
                                                 
 
1 Press Release: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/News-Stories/2010/Aid-budget-to-be-refocused-
to-deliver-better-results-/    11 
 
Through its performance rating systems that focus on economic policy as opposed to aid 
program performance, the World Bank approach takes funds away from fragile states 
(even  where  a  well-designed  aid  program  can  have  a  significant  impact).  The  DFID 
approach  avoids,  or  at  least  limits,  this  by-product  of  ex-ante  selectivity.  Of  course, 
projecting and then measuring the results of an aid program is not without complication, 
but the DFID innovation is certainly worth watching. 
3.2. New forms of results-based aid  
In recent years there has been a growing focus in certain sectors and aid agencies on ex-
post  verification  and  ‘rewarding’  reform  and  development  outcomes  (De  Renzio  & 
Woods 2010). Most progress made in this area has been achieved by focusing more 
specifically and exclusively on clear indicators of development success, which can most 
easily be found in areas of aid support to service delivery.  
One such fund that is directly linking aid to results is the Global Partnership on Output-
Based Aid (GPOBA), a World Bank initiative focussed on payments of aid to the delivery 
of specific services or ‘outputs’. Under this scheme, service delivery is contracted out to 
a third party, usually a private firm, which receives a performance-based subsidy to 
complement or replace the user fee for the service. The idea is to shift performance risk 
to the provider by making them accountable. The World Bank claims this will act as an 
incentive to mobilise private sector engagement and ensure stronger tracking of results 
(World Bank 2009). The aim of the Global Partnership is to mainstream Output-Based 
Aid (OBA) into regular project design. So far, the initiative has identified around 131 
OBA  projects  with  a  total  value  of  around  $3.5  billion  in  the  World  Bank  aid 
infrastructure (World Bank 2010c). The GPOBA also has funding from donors totalling 
$242.6 million to be distributed to programs based on independently verified outputs.  
Another proposal for linking aid to results is Cash on Delivery (COD) aid, championed by 
the Centre for Global Development. While many of its attributes link it closely to ex-post 
outcome-based budget support, which has been tried in the past, its proponents argue 
that it will fundamentally change the delivery mechanisms of aid by paying only for 
verified  incremental  results  (Birdsall  et  al.  2010).  According  to  Birdsall  et  al.  this 
approach  holds  ‘the  promise  of  making  aid  more  effective  and  less  burdensome  by 
fundamentally restructuring the  12 
 
relationships  of  accountability  among  funders,  recipients  and  their  respective 
constituencies’  (Birdsall  et  al.  2010,  p.1.).  DFID  promised  in  the  Conservative  Party 
Green Paper (Conservatives 2009) and in their November 2010 Business Plan (DFID 
2010a), has committed to piloting results-based aid and COD contracts. 
Box 1. DFID’s Pilot Programme on Results-Based Aid and COD Aid  
DFID supports various approaches to providing output-based aid, including most of the 
multilateral  instruments  mentioned  here.  It  categorises  them  as  Results-Based  Aid 
(RBA), an aid relationship between donors and partner governments, or Results-Based 
Funding  (RBF),  an  approach  to  contracting  service  providers  beyond  central 
government, or incentivising beneficiaries to use services.  
DFID is committed under its Structural Reform Plan to ‘pilot Results-Based Aid and Cash 
on  Delivery  contracts  in  three  developing  countries’.  The  most  advanced  cases  at 
different stages of design are:  
1. Ethiopia: Using the COD model to increase the school completion rate for girls: for 
every extra girl completing grade ten, the Government will receive (RBA) USD 150-300 
equivalent, varying by region. Payments are passed on to local schools, which control 
their end-use. The approach is expected to increase completion rates by 10-12% over 
four years.  
2. Uganda: Private non-profit health providers will be paid (RBF) for subsidised or free 
maternal and child health care in certain regions, at approximately USD 10 equivalent 
per child under 5, and USD 5 per pregnant woman. A voucher scheme for transport of 
pregnant women to health facilities is also envisaged to address demand-side issues.  
3. India: Private sector providers are to be paid (RBF) on provision of renewable energy 
technology to poor households. Pricing is to be set by auction to ensure value for money.  
Source: Rogerson 2011 
In line with results-based aid, another proposal is the development of a ‘Health Impact 
Fund’ (HIF) to re-align incentives towards creating a more equitable and efficient global 
health system (Pogge 2011). The HIF is a pay-for-performance mechanism that would 13 
 
offer  pharmaceutical  innovators  the  option  –  no  obligation  –  to  register  any  new 
medicine. By registering a product, a firm would pledge to make it available for ten 
years, wherever it is needed, at no more than the lowest feasible cost of production and 
distribution. In exchange, the registrant would receive annual reward payments for the 
period based on the health impact of its products around the world. Although in the 
early  stages  of  development,  the  HIF  is  just  one  of  many  innovative  results-based 
proposals. 
4. Innovations on the way in which donors and recipients relate 
This section provides some examples of aid innovations that stand outside of the Paris 
orthodoxy but  nevertheless aim to improve the way in which donors and recipients 
interact, how aid is given and how the overall aid architecture is organised. We consider 
the increasing use by aid donors of cash transfers, collaboration with new partners, new 
forms of donor networking, and new ways of contracting technical assistance.  
4.1. Cash transfers  
Cash transfers are direct, regular and predictable non-contributory cash payments that 
help poor and vulnerable households to raise money and smooth incomes (Arnold et al. 
2011). Cash transfers incorporate a range of instruments including social pensions, child 
grants and public work programs. They are designed, implemented and financed in a 
variety of different ways.  
The rationale for cash transfers is quite simple. Low and variable income remains a 
central problem of poverty. It can be helped by the provision of modest but regular 
income in the form of cash transfers. This enables households to sustain spending on 
food, healthcare and schooling in low income periods, without the need to sell assets or 
accrue debt. Over time, cash transfers can help families to build human capital, invest in 
productive assets and obtain access to better credit (Arnold et al. 2011). Cash transfers 
can thus both protect living standards and promote wealth creation (Arnold et al. 2011).  
Cash transfers have rapidly expanded over the past 15 years. This expansion began with 
the  success  of  Mexico’s  conditional  cash  transfer  programs,  which  provide  cash 
payments to low-income families in exchange for regular school attendance, health clinic 14 
 
visits, and nutritional support. Since the late 1990s cash transfers have expanded to at 
least 45 countries implementing cash transfer programs of one type or another. These 
programs reach a total of more than 110 million families (Moss 2011). They have now 
moved into the mainstream of development policy in a number of regions.  
Part  of  the  popularity  of  cash  transfers  has  been  the  incorporation  of  rigorous 
evaluations of the programs into development and implementation. This was largely due 
to the Latin American countries (Brazil and Mexico) that first introduced large-scale 
cash transfer schemes in the late 1990s and incorporated rigorous impact evaluations 
into  their  design  and  implementation.  This  set  a  precedent  that  is  now  gradually 
increasing throughout other regions adopting cash transfers (Arnold et al. 2011).  
The  evidence  shows  that  implementing  well-designed  cash  transfer  programs  can 
address the major risk and vulnerability factors that keep people in chronic poverty. The 
effective  use  of  cash  transfers  can  also  result  in  improving  a  range  of  development 
outcomes  that  can  have  a  direct  impact  on  a  variety  of  MDG  targets.  Through  this 
broader impact and empowerment, cash transfers may also be a way of promoting civil 
society and helping poor people to hold their governments accountable. Cash transfers 
have an important and growing role to play in national and global strategies to reduce 
poverty  and  accelerate  progress  across  a  range  of  MDGS  (Arnold  et  al.  2011). 
Importantly, cash transfers are also considered very economically efficient (Moss 2011).  
As the potential for cash transfers as a development mechanism is realised, proposals 
are being developed for its expanded use in the developing world. One such proposal, 
presented by Todd Moss of the Centre for Global Development, is to use cash transfers to 
fight the resource curse. In this proposal, countries seeking to manage new resource 
wealth  are  encouraged  to  consider  distributing  income  directly  to  citizens  as  cash 
transfers (Moss 2011). There are already cases where this takes place, such as in Alaska 
where dividends from earnings on oil savings have been distributed directly to residents 
since 1982, with similar programs more recently in Bolivia and Mongolia (Moss 2011).  
Moss (2011) argues that, beyond serving as a powerful and proven policy intervention, 
cash transfers can mitigate the corrosive impact of rapidly rising resource revenues (in 
this case from oil) on governance. Through a regular, universal and transparent cash 
transfer payment; Moss (2011) argues that  cash transfers can  complement EITI and 15 
 
other revenue ring-fencing mechanisms to make resource revenues more transparent 
and accountable. This will also have the added benefit of helping to create demands for 
heightened transparency and accountability of all resource revenues.  
The  experience  of  countless  countries  that  have  failed  to  manage  surging  resource 
revenues, which have even proven to be economically and politically destabilising (Moss 
2011), provides a sound justification for trying a new approach. The growing evidence 
of  the  success  of  cash  transfers  on  specific  poverty  alleviation  objectives,  and  the 
growing body of evidence on  its positive indirect  impact  on  a variety of other MDG 
outcomes, suggests that they are a solution worth trying. It may, however, prove harder 
to suggest to developing governments.  
While cash transfers are not themselves new, there is increasing interest from donors in 
supporting them. DFID plans to support cash transfers in 16 country programs, with an 
emphasis on building sustainable, nationally owned systems (DFID 2011). DFID is also 
taking  a  prominent  international  role  in  promoting  cash  transfers  in  international 
forums  and  through  international  financial  institutions,  focusing  on  specific 
partnerships with the World Bank, UNICEF and the EC (Anderson et al. 2011). There is 
also increasing interest in using cash transfers in the context of disaster relief programs.  
Whether cash transfers go through national governments or are made directly from 
donors  to  households,  they  can  be  seen  as  a  low-transaction-cost  way  of  getting 
resources  into  the  hands  of  the  world’s  poor,  and  thus  perhaps  a  simpler  way  of 
achieving Paris Declaration goals.  
4.2. Working with new partners  
Working with new partners, most notably in the private sector, can be pursued through 
public-private  partnerships  that  transform  businesses  into  contractual  agents  in  the 
implementation  of  public  infrastructure  and  service  delivery.  Through  these 
partnerships  aid  can  be  leveraged  to  increase  incentives  for  businesses  to  act  as 
responsible corporate citizens (De Fontaine Vive et al. 2006).  16 
 
An example of these public-private partnerships is the teaming up of DFID, the Clinton 
Foundation and Indian Pharmaceuticals to help reduce the price of selected drugs for 
HIV/AIDS and malaria.2 Another example in the health sector is the Global Alliance on 
Vaccines and Immunisations (GAVI). Launched in 2000, the GAVI alliance is a global 
health partnership representing stakeholders in immunisation from  both private and 
public sectors aiming to accelerate access to underused vaccines, strengthen health and 
immunisation systems, and introduce innovative new immunisation technology (GAVI 
2010). Through GAVI, a total of US$4 billion has been approved for cou ntry programs 
between 2000 and 2015 (GAVI 2010). 
Figure 4: Breakdown of GAVI members 
 
Source: GAVI 2010 
While the majority of these initiatives have been implemented in the health sector, there 
is potential for expansion of donor support in collaboration with, or through, the private 
sector  in  other  areas  of  service  delivery.  The  GPOBA  (discussed  in  section  3),  is  a 
                                                 
 
2 See website: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/accessme
d cines08.asp  17 
 
primary example of how the private sector is being used to implement service-delivery 
based aid to increase efficiency and effectiveness.  
Another  example  of  where  donors  are  making  progress  in  harnessing  a  broader 
involvement  in  foreign  aid  initiatives  is  the  World  Bank’s  ‘Apps  for  Development 
Competition.’3  This competition, with a prize pool of $45,000, aims to challenge the 
development community and general public to make tools, applications and mash-ups 
that can help make development information (now freely accessible from the World 
Bank) more accessible and easily disseminated. 
4.3. Virtual networks for collaboration  
The  creation  of  online  communities  and  knowledge-sharing  platforms  is  a  further 
innovation  (Barder  2009).  Through  these  knowledge-sharing  platforms,  donors  can 
draw information from other actors with experience in that region or sector. Donors can 
also  use  this  knowledge  to  learn  from  others  mistakes  and  build  upon  previous 
successes. The World Bank’s ‘Open Data Initiative’ is an example of major donors trying 
to help others make better, more informed decisions to solving development challenges. 
Another  example  from  the  World  Bank,  in  collaboration  with  AidData  and  the 
Development  Gateway,  is  the  ‘Mapping  for  Results  Initiative’,  that  attempts  to 
geographically map the allocation of aid within a country4, helping donors to see what 
resources are available in their region or secto r to facilitate greater coordination and 
knowledge sharing. The UN has similarly initiated the ‘Global Pulse’ project that aims to 
create a  free  and open  source technology platform for collaborative analysis.5  All of 
these systems are still in development, but if even one succeeds the result would be an 
online  international  aid  community  that  could  revolutionise  the  aid  industry  and 
eliminate the knowledge burden of conventional donors.  
 
                                                 
 
3 See Website: http://appsfordevelopment.challengepost.com/     
4 See http://www.aiddata.org/home/index for geographical listings from over 70 countries.    
5 See website: http://www.unglobalpulse.org/strategy-and-roadmap 18 
 
4.4. Market-based reforms for technical assistance  
Donors continue to provide a large proportion of aid in the form of experts and training, 
despite evidence that technical assistance on average is relatively inefficient (Riddell 
2007).  Technical  assistance  makes  up  about  25%  of  official  aid  on  average  and 
traditional responses to improve the effectiveness of technical assistance focus on cost-
cutting  and  better  management.  But  what  about  measures  to  make  the  market  for 
technical assistance work better?  
The market for experts and trainers suffers from missing and imperfect information and 
principal-agent problems. If donors and recipients can get better information on the 
quality of personnel, their availability, the scope of work and feedback on performance, 
this could improve the functioning of the labour market and lead  to lower costs and 
better  allocation  of  resources.  These  issues  are  not  unique  to  the  market  for 
development experts and there may be lessons to be learnt from the private sector, 
including the freelance service sector.  
The  growth  of  virtual  marketplaces  and  workspaces  offers  some  solutions  to  high 
transaction costs and imperfect information. Over the last decade the growth of web-
based solutions has transformed the market. For example, Elance.com helps more than 
200,000 clients to find, buy, manage and pay for external services and contractors from 
more  than  2,000  suppliers  across  50+  services  categories,  including  information 
technology,  consulting,  contract  and  temporary  labor,  marketing,  print,  human 
resources,  engineering,  maintenance  and  facilities.  Web-based  marketplaces,  such 
Elance.com, and also its development equivalent Devex.com, contain fully searchable 
information on providers, including evaluations and feedback on quality. The web-based 
workspace  enables  the  management  of  projects,  including  performance  milestones, 
submission of outputs, payment and feedback.  
5. Innovations to improve donor quality  
This section provides some examples of aid innovations that aim to improve the quality 
of  aid  recipients.  The  geographical  and  political  separation  between  donors  and 
beneficiaries  has  created  a  ‘broken  feedback  loop’  (Barder, 2009)  in  the  delivery  of 
foreign aid. Taxpayers in donor countries have no knowledge of programs financed by 19 
 
their governments and the intended beneficiaries have no political leverage over the 
agencies that determine the flows of aid to their country. This breakdown of feedback in 
the system undermines performance of aid donors because they are not subject to the 
accountability and feedback mechanisms that govern the rest of the public  sector in 
developed countries (Howes, 2011). Some innovations that have been adopted in this 
area  include:  selectivity,  transparency,  independent  evaluation,  crowdsourcing  aid 
information and feedback, selectivity, volatility.  
5.1. Increased selectivity  
Aid  agencies  differ  from  most  domestic  agencies  because  of  the  breadth  of  their 
coverage. Aid agencies are expected to work across many regions in a variety of sectors. 
This imposes a significant knowledge burden on aid agencies (Howes 2011), creating a 
risk  that  aid  experts  will  lack  the  knowledge  to  implement  development  objectives 
effectively. Various aid agencies have begun to realise the breadth of their activities are 
limiting development objectives, and have taken considerable and varied steps to tackle 
the knowledge burden their staff face.  
The most common approach to reducing the knowledge burden is through reducing aid 
partners and increasing selectivity of sectoral involvement. By limiting their focus, both 
regionally and in the scope of sectors they are actively involved in, donors can build 
expertise and trust in certain areas where they are committed to achieving development 
results. This is an area in which rhetoric can easily outstrip results. There are, however, 
some successes, or at  least  encouraging efforts. Donors in the European  Union have 
agreed to work in no more than three sectors in any one country, and UK DFID has 
announced  that  it will  close  16  of its  bilateral  programs  by  2016  (Independent  Aid 
Review, 2011).  
5.2. Aid transparency  
Transparency  has  now  become  a  critical  part  of  promoting  a  story  of  successful 
development. Through transparency ‘donors and recipients can be held accountable for 
what they spend, more players can become actively engaged in development efforts by 
identifying  underserved  areas  and  niches,  and  aid  can  be  more  effective  through 
learning’ (Kharas 2010, p. 258). Donor governments have also realised that in order to 20 
 
maintain a continued scaling-up of aid, they must make their aid flows more transparent 
and accountable. Agencies have committed to transparency through a variety of policy 
responses.  
In the past two years, for example, the World Bank has undergone a radical shift in its 
disclosure  paradigm.  In  2009  the  Bank  accepted  a  proposal  that  would  shift  its 
disclosure  policy  from  one  that  spells  out  what  the  Bank  may  disclose,  to  one  that 
presumes that the Bank will disclose any information in its possession that is not on a 
list  of  exceptions  (World  Bank  2009).  This  policy  of  full  disclosure,  mainly  shown 
through  its  website,  is  presenting  challenges  in  displaying  the  wealth  of  available 
information,  collected  in  some  instances  over  50  years.  The  World  Bank  has  also 
initiated  the  ‘Open  Data  Initiative’,6  which  provides  free  access  to  more  than  2,000 
indicators on developing countries from around the world. Both of these initiatives are 
driven  by  a  desire  to  foster  public  ownership,  partnership  and  participation  in 
development from a wide range of stakeholders (World Bank 2009). 
DFID has also made radical adjustments to their disclosure paradigm. On June 3 2010 
the UK government introduced a new ‘Aid Transparency Guarantee’,7 pledging to make 
their aid system fully transparent to citizens in both the UK and recipient governments. 
The transparency guarantee will begin on DFID’s website from January 2011. Monthly 
spending information is already available on the DFID website.  
EuropeAid has also made promises to report on its activities in an accurate, accountable 
and transparent manner, with major evaluations now available on its website. Other 
major  bilateral  agencies,  including  Australia,  Japan  and  Germany,  are  also  making 
greater efforts to increase the accountability and transparency of their aid flows, but still 
lag  behind  the  initiative  displayed  by  DFID  and  the  World  Bank  towards  complete 
disclosure. A number of agencies have signed up to the International Aid Transparency 
Initiative or IATI (see Box 2).  
While these new initiatives are clearly a step in the right direction towards increasing 
the effectiveness of aid, considerable work is needed in improving the accessibility of 
                                                 
 
6 The ‘Open Data Initiative’ website: http://data.worldbank.org/     
7 See Website: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Global-Issues/What-transparency-means-for-DFID/UK-Aid-
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information. It is pointless to publish information about donor activities and initiatives 
online  if  the  websites  cannot  be  easily  navigated  and  the  information  is  not 
disseminated  to  the  widest  possible  audience.  Donors  could  take  note  of  the  Bill  & 
Melinda Gates Foundation’s grant database. The Foundation provides online listings of 
every  grant  distributed  by  the  program,  outlining  information  including  the  goals, 
timeline and contact  website of the grant holder8. A detailed search function allows 
users to easily filter information to find specific p rojects in their focus area. Another 
example is the USAID dashboard function,9 which is easy to navigate, presents data in 
intuitive graph and visualisations, as well as numbers, and provides sectoral information 
on commitments and disbursements to all rec ipient countries. All of the data is also 
updated to 2012 commitments. Without databases of this nature to filter and properly 
categorise information, accountability and transparency of aid projects will not be 
achieved. 
Box 2: The International Aid Transparency Initiative  
The International Aid Transparency (IATI) was launched at the Accra Agenda for Action 
Summit  2008.  Its  objectives  are  to  make  information  about  aid  spending  easier  to 
‘access, use and understand’ and to help implement the transparency commitments of 
the Accra Agenda for Action.10  
The IATI will attempt to develop consistent and coherent international standards for the 
way donors report information about aid spending. It will not create new databases or 
replace existing work and information but build on – and go beyond – the standards and 
definitions that have already been agreed.  
As of 2010, the IATI was undertaking ‘Proof of Concept  Pilot  Studies’ in six partner 
countries,  further  discussing  the  exact  code  of  conduct  for  IATI  signatories  and 
encouraging more donors and partners to join the. IATI has also formed the definitions, 
data structure and format of phase 1 of the proposed IATI standard, of which four to five 
signatories will start to implement by December 2010, and will aim to implement before 
                                                 
 
8 The Gates Foundation Database can be found here: 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/grants/Pages/search.aspx     
9 USAID Country Dashboard: http://foreignassistance.gov      
10 A full list of signatories of the IATI can be found at: http://www.aidtransparency.net/whos-involved     22 
 
November 2011 (IATI 2010). The IATI expects to launch its phase 2 set of standards and 
a registry for reporting aid spending at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Busan 2011. Upon completion of phase 2 standards and registry, IATI expects to disband 
with activities being transferred to other organisations.  
Source: (IATI 2010) and the IATI Website: http://www.aidtransparency.net/  
5.3. Independent Evaluation  
Independent evaluation has been present in multilaterals for decades. The World Bank 
established the Independent Evaluation Group in 1973, an (increasingly) independent 
unit within the World Bank Group. The Asian Development Bank has maintained an 
Independent  Evaluation  Department  for  over  three  decades,  which  is  progressively 
becoming  more  independent  from  the  ADB  itself.11  While  multilaterals  have  had 
independent evaluation for a long time (underpinned by reporting dire ctly to their 
Banks’  shareholders,  bypassing  the  Presidents  of  two  institutions),  it  has  long  been 
considered  that  independent  evaluation  was  an  unrealistic  aspiration  for  bilateral 
agencies. This modality of thinking is now being challenged.  
In  2010  DFID  announced  an  ‘Independent  Commission  for  Aid  Impact’  (ICAI),  an 
independent body designed to ensure aid projects are delivering maximum value for 
money  (DFID  2010b).  The  Commission  is  expected  to  lead  the  world  in  aid 
accountability,  combining  both  audit  scrutiny  and  development  evaluation.12  This 
information  will  all  be  freely  and  immediately  available  on  its  website  without 
government interference. The Independent Commission was launched in 2011 and has 
begun publishing reports.13  
Sweden, through the Swed ish Agency for Development Evaluation, has maintained a 
government-funded independent agency to evaluate Swedish international development 
cooperation  since  2006, 14  though  it was  established  in  a different  location  to  the 
Swedish agency, and its effectiveness is still to be demonstrated. The United States has 
                                                 
 
11 See http://www.adb.org/Evaluation/      
12 Independent Commission for Aid Impact Press Release: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/News-
Stories/2010/New-independent-commission-unveiled/     
13 See http://icai.independent.gov.uk/    
14 SADEV website: http://www.sadev.se/en/About-SADEV/     23 
 
long  been  subject  to  monitoring  by  the  independent  USAID  Office  of  the  Inspector 
General and has recently announced its own aid evaluation policy.  
5.4. Crowdsourcing aid information and feedback  
While the internet and social media are not yet ubiquitous in developing countries, over 
the last decade there has been stellar growth in the use of mobile phones. According to 
recent data,15 there are about 5 billion mobile phone subscribers globally, of whom 8 40 
million are in China, 820 million are in South Asia and 500 million are in sub -Saharan 
Africa.  
There are a growing number of initiatives that make use of mobile phones to monitor 
projects and get feedback from beneficiaries. Here are just a few example s. Daraja, an 
NGO  in  rural  Tanzania  aiming  to  make  local  government  more  responsive  to 
communities, is using SMS messaging to provide feedback about which water points are 
working.16  GlobalGiving,  a  charity  fundraising  website  for  social  entrepreneurs  in 
developing countries, is using Ushahidi, a tech NGO working on software for information 
collection  and  dissemination,  and  working  with  Map  Kibera, 17  a  citizen  reporting 
network based in Kenya, Nairobi. They have been training volunteers to collect stories 
about  any  ‘community  effort’  and  posting  them  to  a  public  SMS-feedback-enabled 
website. Other examples include SMS-based systems (e.g. Ushahidi’s crisis reporting), 
smart-phone  systems  (e.g.  Kenyan  crop  insurance)  and  web-based  systems  (e.g. 
eMoksha’s Fix Our City).18 MobileActive, a global network aiming to improve the use of 
mobile technology as a tool for social impact, is putting together a list of similar 
projects.19 
Many developing countries are making strides to connect communities through mobile 
phones  and other technologies. This is an important opportunity for donors to fix 
feedback loops from recipients to implementers, donor agencies and taxpayers. Once 
this tipping point is reached, will development aid ever look the same again? 
                                                 
 
15 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10569081      
16 See website: http://www.daraja.org/our-work/rtwp     
17 See websites: http://www.globalgiving.org/, www.ushahidi.com, http://voiceofkibera.org/     
18 See websites: http://www.ted.com/talks/erik_hersman_on_reporting_crisis_via_texting.html;  
http://www.economist.com/node/15663856?story_id=15663856 ; http://www.emoksha.org/     
19 See website: http://mobileactive.org/  24 
 
5.5. Smoother (less volatile) aid  
A recent survey on the implementation of the Paris declaration (OECD 2008) showed 
that in any average country only 45% of aid arrives when promised (Deutscher et al 
2008). The aid shocks faced by aid-dependent nations as a result of aid volatility are 
comparable in size and frequency to major global economic shocks faced by developed 
countries.  This  volatility  is  often  caused  by  humanitarian  aid  responses  to  shocks, 
donors being too discretionary or crises in the international system, often funded by the 
re-prioritisation  of  funds  away  from  development  projects  (Kharas  2009a).  Kharas 
(2009a) estimates the deadweight loss of such high volatility, which is also pro-cyclical, 
to be in the order of 15–20% of net ODA or about US$18 billion annually. Donors have 
undertaken mixed policy responses with regards to their discretionary practices.  
An  example of how donors can  consider institutional arrangements that  would help 
reduce  this  volatility  can  be  found  in  Scandinavian  countries,  which  maintain 
parliamentary approval of priority countries for aid allocations and strategies. These 
parliamentary discussions and decisions allow donor agencies to put in place longer-
term  commitments  (Desai  &  Kharas  2010).  Other  bilateral  agencies  are  also  slowly 
moving towards multi-year commitments to individual countries (Kharas 2008), which 
can also help to reduce the overall volatility of aid contributions. These commitments to 
reducing aid volatility are only slowly being implemented and they impact only a small 
portion of net ODA contributions (Desai & Kharas 2010). If policymakers choose to take 
aid volatility more seriously, there are some technical proposals available for piloting 
that could help limit overall volatility.  
One example, by Berg et al (2010), proposes that the IMF should permit countries to 
draw upon foreign exchange reserves when there is a shortfall on aid. Proposals such as 
this, along with others such as budget insurance and counter-cyclical budget support 




6. Conclusions  
This paper has outlined recent innovations that have been undertaken in the global aid 
and development architecture. The breadth and size of these innovations, taking place in 
most  major  donors,  is  indicative  of  the  growing  pressure  to  improve  the  overall 
effectiveness of aid expenditure.  
The  first  set  of  innovations  described  were  measures  to  improve  the  quality  of  aid 
recipients.  They  focus  primarily  on  linking  aid  more  closely  to  performance.  This  is 
being done both through improving ex-ante selectivity and shifting to ex-post, results-
based verification.  
The second set of innovations outlined were measures to change and improve how aid is 
given  and  the  way  in  which  donors  and  recipients  interact.  For  various  reasons 
harmonisation and alignment are failing to be implemented at an acceptable pace. But 
donors have begun working through alternative channels, notably NGOs and the private 
sector, particularly in health and pharmaceuticals benefiting from greater information, 
expertise, networks and new technologies that would otherwise be unavailable to them. 
Other  innovations  aiming  to  change  the  way  aid  is  given  include  increasing  the 
selectivity of bilateral partners and sectors and the creation of global virtual networks 
for collaboration that can help reduce the knowledge burden and market-based reforms 
to improve the effectiveness of technical assistance.  
The final set of innovations discussed were those to improve the quality of aid donors. 
Individual donors are taking a variety of different steps towards improving their overall 
effectiveness  including  increasing  selectivity,  making  aid  transparency  a  central 
component  of  development,  strengthening  the  role  of  independent  evaluation  (an 
innovation  for  bilateral  agencies),  expanding  the  use  of  crowdsourcing  to  improve 
information and feedback on aid interventions, and reducing aid volatility. These steps 
will help donors to learn more and scale up programs that work, improving the quality 
of aid delivered at the same time as justifying their existence to the taxpayer.  
These innovations show that in the 21st century, aid agencies can adapt and evolve in 
response  to  the  changing  global  architecture  around  them.  A  combination  of 
collaborating with new partners and experimenting with new approaches will enable 26 
 
them  to  do  this.  .  This  paper  demonstrates  that  there  is  clearly  a  wide  variety  of 
approaches  and  ideas  as  to  how  to  improve  aid  effectiveness.  Not  all  of  these 
innovations will work, some are still in the experimental phase (one is yet to be adopted 
by donors at all – the use of e-contracting in technical assistance) and some may simply 
be bad ideas, but that should not limit donors from continuing to push the boundaries of 
aid delivery and effectiveness. The key for donors is to start selecting good ideas for 
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